
































2Energy Research & Social Science 23 (2017) 36–45
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Energy  Research  &  Social  Science
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate /erss
riginal  research  article
omes  as  machines:  Exploring  expert  and  public  imaginaries  of  low
arbon  housing  futures  in  the  United  Kingdom
.  Cherrya,∗,  C.  Hopfeb,  B.  MacGillivrayc, N.  Pidgeona
Tower Building, School of Psychology, Cardiff University, CF10 3AT, UK
School of Civil and Building Engineering, Loughborough University, Loughborough, LE11 3TU, UK
The Sustainable Places Research Institute, Cardiff University, 33 Park Place, CF10 3BA, UK
 r  t  i  c  l e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 7 April 2016
eceived in revised form 21 October 2016






a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Low  carbon  housing  policies  embody  visions  of the  future  that  shape  and  constrain  current  choices
between  different  technological  pathways.  These  socio-technical  imaginaries  include  expectations
around  new  ways  of living  and  interacting  with  technology,  with  implications  for everyday  lives. This
paper  investigates  existing  expert  visions  of low  carbon  housing,  and  explores  these  futures  with  mem-
bers  of  the  public;  utilising  empirical  data  from  policy  documents,  expert  interviews  and  public  focus
groups.  Two  competing  expert  visions  of low  carbon  housing  were  identiﬁed:  Passivhaus  and  Smart
Homes.  Whilst  portrayed  as divergent  futures,  both  visions  aimed  to  ‘design  out’ the  role  of  occu-
pants,  achieving  emissions  reductions  through  changes  to the  built  environment  and  maintaining  current
lifestyles;  a  position  that was  reinforced  by an  imagined  public  that was  unable  or unwilling  to accept  the
need  for  lifestyle  change.  This construction  of  the  public  did  not  consider  the  complex  personal  and  cul-
tural  dimensions  that  inﬂuenced  public  acceptability  of future  housing:  speciﬁcally  surrounding  themes
of  comfort,  control  and  security  that arose  within  the  focus  groups.  The  tensions  arising  between  expert
and  public  imaginaries  highlight  the  difﬁculties  that  may  surround  any  transition  towards  a low  carbon
future  and  demonstrate  the  need  to  work  with,  rather  than  around,  the  public.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license. Introduction
Accounting for 23% of national carbon emissions [11] and 29% of
otal energy consumption [18], housing is a crucial site for achiev-
ng emissions reductions if the ambitious 80% target set out within
he UK Climate Change Act 2008 is to be met. Due to the relative dif-
culty of achieving emissions reductions in other sectors (such as
viation), it is predicted that the domestic sector will need to reduce
missions to nearly zero by 2050 [10]. As such, radical demand
eduction strategies will be required, in addition to the provision of
ow carbon energy. Over recent years, a range of approaches, poli-
ies and standards have aimed to reduce energy demand within
he sector, through improving the energy efﬁciency of existing
omes, increasing uptake of domestic renewable energy sources, or
mproving the sustainability of new build housing. Combining new
echnologies, social structures, institutions and discourses, these
olicies embody visions of a low carbon housing future; ‘socio-
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technical imaginaries’ that will shape and constrain future choices
between different technology pathways [36].
Over the last decade, the precise vision of low carbon hous-
ing embedded within UK policy has shifted. The concept of a zero
carbon house rose to prominence around 2006 with the Code for
Sustainable Homes and Zero Carbon Homes Target, both advo-
cating sustainable, carbon neutral housing that is highly energy
efﬁcient, makes use of renewable energy sources and is acceptable
to eco-conscious consumers who would purchase them. However,
by 2015, this vision of the future had fallen into disfavour, with
national policy shifting towards energy security and affordabil-
ity. Despite this, the urgency of the challenge to reduce carbon
emissions from UK housing stocks remains unchanged. Beyond
the material and technical challenge of reducing carbon emissions
associated with housing, low carbon houses are also homes, where
complex material and social elements interact (relating to both how
the building is made and how it is used) to determine household
energy use [69,50]. As such, low carbon housing imaginaries will
include visions of new ways of living and interacting with tech-
nology, which have implications for everyday lives. The ways that
scientists and experts imagine the future and users is known to have
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 signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the material technology and design, the
scripting’ of user behaviour, and policy development [38,1,37,70].
The ways in which occupants are constructed as ‘imagined
ublics’ [46] will play a key role in the visions of a low carbon
ousing future held by housing and energy professionals and will
e crucial in shaping the future of UK housing. As such, low car-
on housing presents an ideal case study through which to explore
isions of a low carbon future from a range of different perspectives.
he ﬁrst aim of this paper is to explore the socio-technical imaginar-
es of a low carbon housing future, paying particular attention to the
inks between these visions of the future and the imagined publics
hat inhabit them. In a novel addition to this approach, the paper
lso seeks to explore these expert derived visions of a low carbon
ousing future with members of the public themselves, investi-
ating their acceptability alongside the values and concerns which
hape their perceptions of these possible futures. Before consider-
ng such questions, we provide a discussion of the theoretical and
mpirical literature that informs this study, as well as an account
f low carbon housing policy in the UK, exploring how visions of a
ow carbon housing future have developed within UK Government
ver the past 15 years.
. Socio-technical imaginaries and imagined publics
Expectations and visions of potential futures are co-constructed
rom both social and technological dimensions; embodying innova-
ive technologies, emerging industrial and institutional structures,
nd broader social and political discourses [7,30]. These visions
hape technology, policy and society through dynamic processes
hat maintain and create socio-technical networks [30]. Termed
socio-technical imaginaries’, Jasanoff and Kim [36]:120 deﬁne
hese visions as ‘collectively imagined forms of social life and social
rder reﬂected in the design and fulﬁlment of nation-speciﬁc scien-
iﬁc and/or technical projects, [which] at once describe attainable
utures and prescribe futures that the state believe ought to be
ttained’. Reﬂecting normative prescriptions of what is socially and
echnically possible, desirable and morally right, imaginaries can be
nderstood as performative; these imagined futures have power to
hape both the present and the future when evoked and discussed
58].
Various studies have explored socio-technical imaginaries at
ifferent scales and in relation to different socio-technical sys-
ems e.g., [59,51,41,58,3,37], demonstrating how they act to shape
nd constrain choices between different socio-technical pathways.
maginaries are therefore not neutral and act as frames, or rhetor-
cal tools, to include and exclude different rhetorical and material
spects of the debate and promote a speciﬁc vision of the future.
s such they can be used to: guide and co-ordinate action; justify
ecision making and the inclusion of different actor in this process;
nd establish the need for political action [3]. A longstanding strand
f Science and Technology Studies which explores the relation-
hip between technological design and future users, highlights the
ay in which designers and engineers imagine users exerts perfor-
ative function on the development pathways of technology, and
scripts’ user behaviour [38,1,42]. In addition, the ways in which
ublics are constructed within broader socio-technical imaginar-
es has also been shown to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on policy
evelopment and material technology and design e.g., [70,5,58,37].
Based on Maranta et al.’s [46] notion of ‘imagined layper-
ons’, describe how publics ‘exist as imaginaries given agency
nd invoked for strategic purposes’ [70]:932, assigned a presumed
ubjectivity within shared discourse that can be invoked dur-
ng decision making that may  frame continuing layperson-expert
nteractions. Barnett et al. [5] thus highlight the role of experts as
layperson makers’, whose perceived subjectivities shape the rolesocial Science 23 (2017) 36–45 37
and opportunities for public participation and engagement, with
these conceptualisations of the public used to deﬁne and support
the underlying normative rationales of these interactions. A recur-
ring theme throughout such research has been the construction of
the public (by professionals and scientists) as deﬁcient in some way,
in terms of their knowledge, skills, rationality or sense of environ-
mental responsibility [73]. As such, they are often seen as a barrier
to achieving technological potential; a view which has become
tantamount to common sense in many professions [21]. Research
into innovative nano- and bio- technologies, also demonstrates this
othering of publics by scientists, who see them as ignorant and
ill-informed [47,53]. As such, these imagined publics may  actu-
ally have more inﬂuence than the ‘real’ publics they purportedly
represent [70].
Together these approaches have been used to explore the
expectations and visions of the future that are tied to sustainable
technologies and the imagined publics that are embedded within
them, including: renewable energy siting [70,22], solar panels [2],
hydrogen fuel cells [9] and smart grids [57,3,67]. Skjølsvold’s [58]
research in Norway is of particular interest, demonstrating the
importance of exploring the performativity of visions of the future
retrospectively. The way in which the smart grid was imagined
inﬂuenced policy development over the preceding 15 years; occur-
ring ﬁrst through stage-setting (encouraging debate and enrolling
new actors) and second through acting as a regulative tool (estab-
lishing the need for political and technical change). Beyond this,
imaginaries also acted through a more subtle process, leading to an
evolution in the vision of what the smart grid was and could be in
the future.
Two  competing imaginaries of publics were identiﬁed within
expert visions of the smart grid [57]. An active public that was
engaged with new smart technologies was  considered an essential
component of demand management within the broader socio-
technical imaginaries of the smart grid. Paradoxically, this vision
of the economically and technically rational ‘Resource Man’, who
will both beneﬁt from and make possible this transition [66] was
opposed (and eventually defeated) by an imagined public that was
seen as irrational and deﬁcient in knowledge. This contradiction
eventually led to the development of a set of idealised rational
publics through which to script the technology, effectively bypass-
ing the public input that had originally been desired. This ﬁnding is
echoed by research in other areas, where experts attempt to design
out the role of the public through a combination of technical opti-
mism and cultural pessimism [2]. How experts communicate on
and engage with members of the public has thus also been seen
to be dependent on imagined publics. Ballo [3] highlights how an
almost utopian vision of the future smart grid led experts to cul-
tivate a glossy vision of the technology within public messaging,
omitting legitimate concerns and likely to alienate rather than enrol
the public.
3. Case study: the rise and fall of low carbon housing
futures in UK policy
This section retrospectively traces the transformation of low
carbon housing imaginaries over the last 15 years. Prior to 2001,
housing policy debates were largely silent on issues surrounding
climate change and sustainability [71]. At this time, links between
energy and housing policy focused heavily on fuel poverty and the
energy efﬁciency of public sector housing developments. Whilst
a sustainable housing movement had grown in the UK since the
1970s [44], the concept didn’t arrive on the policy agenda until
around 2003. In addition to the rising importance of climate change,
which was fundamental to the development of low carbon hous-
ing policy, the EU Parliament (through the Energy Performance in





























































Participant’s primary areas of expertise (secondary areas of expertise included in
brackets).
Area of expertise No. experts
Housing and Energy Policy 6 (3)
Industry and Architecture 6 (1)8 C. Cherry et al. / Energy Resear
uildings Directive – EPBD)1 and environmental campaigners put
ressure on the UK Government to produce a framework for sus-
ainable housing. Following a number of key reports on housing
nd sustainability [49,4,55], 2005 saw the concept of a ‘zero carbon
ouse’ set out within the Environmental Audit Committee’s ‘Hous-
ng: building a sustainable future’ report, which recommended a
ero carbon target for all new build housing [24].
Sustainable housing began to be reimagined as a solution to cli-
ate change [44], marking the beginning of a new low carbon vision
or UK housing, with the then Minister for Housing and Planning,
vette Cooper declaring the need ‘to go further and faster’ [27]:3
n tackling emissions from the housing sector. Acting as a stage-
etting device [58] to encourage debate and engage new actors,
his vision for a low carbon housing sector remained vague at
rst, primarily a rhetorical call for new sustainable, carbon neutral
pproaches to housing that would tackle climate change, energy
ecurity and affordability in a cost effective way. Whilst still pri-
arily considered consumers, the public were conceptualised as
nvironmentally conscious ‘eco-consumers’ that desire low carbon,
nvironmentally friendly homes, and are willing to pay for more
xpensive low carbon properties.
With the announcement of the Code for Sustainable Homes [15]
nd the Zero Carbon Homes Target [34], this vision of a low carbon
ousing future ﬁnally gained more explicit agency within regula-
ory tools in December 2006. Aiming to achieve completely zero
arbon homes, these policies challenged the construction indus-
ry to produce zero carbon housing by 2016 through a gradual
ightening of building regulations and a series of sustainability
equirements [16] and led to the institutionalisation of this low
arbon housing vision through the creation of the UK Green Build-
ng Council (UKGBC) and the Government-Industry sponsored Zero
arbon Hub. Responding to criticisms of the technically vague spec-
ﬁcation of zero carbon housing, a number of reports [68,74,17]
ulminated in the introduction of the Fabric Energy Efﬁciency Stan-
ard (FEES) and the Carbon Compliance Level (CCL), which set out
he maximum energy demand (for heating and cooling) and the
inimum onsite low carbon energy requirements of a ‘zero carbon’
ouse.
However, this vision, as set out within UK housing and
nergy policy, was ultimately short lived. With the election of
he Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government in May
010, support for low carbon housing policy decreased, leading
o repeated redeﬁnitions of zero carbon housing and reduction
n the strength of the Zero Carbon Target. This saw a number of
reviously key policy requirements excluded, including unregu-
ated emissions associated with energy use in the home (from
ooking/appliances), as well as reductions in the CCL and approval
or off-site offsetting of emissions that cannot be cost-effectively
educed on-site [75]. These changes highlight a signiﬁcant reduc-
ion in the Government’s ambition to transform the housing sector,
ith the focus on sustainability and climate change replaced by
oncern for energy efﬁciency and cost competitiveness. Over time,
urther announcements progressively weakened low carbon hous-
ng policy, and in 2015 the Code for Sustainable Homes and the Zero
arbon Target were ofﬁcially scrapped [33]. Despite the shifting
olicy agenda and rhetoric, both the Labour and Coalition Govern-
ent visions of a low carbon housing future were deeply embedded
ithin the techno-economic paradigm. Both Governments char-
cterised the problem as about ‘changing buildings rather than
bout changing lifestyles’ [52]:342, largely neglecting the question
f behaviour change in the home.
1 The Directive was later recast in 2010, to include a mandatory target of all new
uildings to be nearly zero energy by 2021 (European Council, 2010).Academia and Research 3 (2)
Campaigning and Lobbying 4 (3)
Sustainable Living 3 (0)
With climate change no longer central to low carbon housing
policy, efforts to reduce emissions now advocated reducing home
energy bills through energy efﬁciency measures. A purposeful effort
was made to reframe energy efﬁciency improvements as ‘home
improvements’ [28]; a framing that was reﬂected in the media dis-
course [14]. A shift in imagined publics coincided with this, with
members of the public considered as individual and economically
rational consumers, concerned only with the costs and beneﬁts of
installing energy efﬁciency measures, and thus no longer the eco-
consumers envisioned by previous policy. With energy efﬁciency
framed as a consumer good, cost, along with the hassle of instal-
lation and a lack of education/information, were seen as the major
barriers to consumer adoption of demand reduction measures.
Combined, the promotion of this adapted vision for a low carbon
housing future led to the omission, if not purposeful marginalisa-
tion, of other aspects of low carbon housing, including the role of
social and behavioural change in reducing emissions, as well as the
issue of embodied carbon emissions within the construction of the
house (estimated to be as high as 50% of lifecycle emissions [16]).
4. Methods
‘The strength of an argument about imaginaries often depends
on creative juxtaposition of evidence from a variety of sources,
using multiple methods’ [29]. As such, we adopted an approach
that combined documentary analysis with expert interviews and
public focus groups to explore the visions of a low carbon hous-
ing future from different perspectives. Policy documents provide
a useful and accessible source of national imaginaries. A collec-
tion of over 50 relevant documents was compiled, comprising of
ofﬁcial UK and EU policy documents and statements, Government
white papers, NGO reports and guides, and Parliamentary Commit-
tee reports and consultations. These were examined for the visions
of a low carbon housing future they described and the ways the
public were imagined within them.
Semi-structured interviews were utilised to facilitate a ‘commu-
nicative opening up and analytical reconstruction of the subjective
dimension of expert knowledge’ [6]:52. These were designed to
access and explore shared meanings within expert imaginaries of
low carbon housing, focusing particularly on 1) the conceptual and
technical meanings of low carbon housing, 2) visions of a low car-
bon housing future, and 3) conceptualisations of the public within
this context. 22 expert interviews (lasting approximately 1 h) were
conducted between May  2013 and February 2014. A diverse range
of experts were sampled based on their professional expertise in
the areas of housing and energy, falling into one or more of the fol-
lowing categories (see Table 1): Government Policy; Industry and
Architecture; Academia and Research; Campaigning and Lobbying;
or Sustainable Living. Sampling and analysis progressed through a
theoretical sampling strategy [25] associated with the analytical
grounded theory method utilised within this research, until theo-
retical saturation was deemed to be reached (with no new themes
or relationships arising within later interviews).
Focus groups, were chosen to explore this topic with members
of the public due to their ability to explore the ways in meanings
are (re)produced in everyday life [45]. The protocol was  designed
C. Cherry et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 23 (2017) 36–45 39
Table  2
Key characteristics of focus groups participants including location, gender split, age range, living arrangements and range of occupations.
Group characteristics
Focus Group 1 2 Female and 3 Male participants, aged 25–33
Postgraduate students Living in rented or shared accommodation
Cardiff Postgraduate students
Focus Group 2 4 Female and 2 Male participants, aged 27–56
Farming community Homeowners (houses, cottages and farmhouses)
Newcastle Emlyn Farmers and veterinary staff
Focus group 3 2 Female and 2 Male participants, aged 26–87
Church group Homeowners (houses and bungalows)
King’s Lynn Machine engineers, a teacher and retired individuals
Focus Group 4 5 Female and 1 Male participants, aged 26–81
Grangetown residents Mixed homeownership (houses) and renting (ﬂats)

















































3 Female and 3 Male participa
Homeowners (Houses, bunga
Retired professionals
o follow from the discussions held during the expert interviews,
xploring 1) public perceptions of low carbon housing options
nd 2) the social and technical concerns and assumptions asso-
iated with assessing the suitability of low carbon housing as a
uture home. In order to maximise group interaction and discus-
ion, pre-existing groups or communities were sampled. Although
ot recreating a truly ‘natural’ setting for group discussion, this
rovided a greater approximation to everyday conversation with
amily, friends and colleagues [39]. Increasing the ease of conver-
ation in this way led to a deeper probing between participants
han may  have otherwise occurred and allowed an insight into
hared sense-making around novel concepts and technologies. Five
omogenous groups were conducted (a group of postgraduate stu-
ents; a farming community; a church group; an inner-city, local
ommunity; and an environmental group), selected to represent
 broad range of backgrounds and provide a diverse mix  of par-
icipants in terms of gender, age, socio-economic status and living
rrangements (see Table 2).
Most participants were previously unaware of the existing low
arbon housing options. In order to stimulate discussion of the
aterial and technological features of these houses, as well as the
mplications these may  have for everyday life within these houses,
hoto and video elicitation tasks were designed. Seven photographs
f existing low carbon housing options were presented, chosen to
emonstrate the aesthetic variation of the broad range of housing
ypes available. Video tours of ﬁve different low carbon houses were
resented, chosen to represent as broad a range of options as pos-
ible, focusing on demonstrating a range of different technological
ystems, as well as a split between new build and retroﬁtted prop-
rties. See [13] for more information on the photographs used and
inks/transcripts of the videos. Discussions lasted approximately
 h and include open questions before speciﬁc prompts were used
o explore the aesthetic, technical and social dimensions of these
ouses.
Data from both the interviews and public groups was tran-
cribed and coded within the NVivo qualitative analysis software
ackage. A grounded approach to data analysis (derived from
rounded theory – see [25,32,65,12]) was adopted for each data
et to develop a coding framework that was grounded within the
ata collected and not prescribed prior to the analysis. The pro-
ess involved: open-coding to generate codes at different levels
f theoretical complexity (from simple descriptions to concep-
ual categories); constant comparison between/within codes to
nsure good ‘ﬁt’ with the data; the keeping of theoretical memos
f emerging thoughts, insights and concepts; and ﬁnally a process
f (re)grouping these codes within broader and more theoreticallyged 60–68
nd cottages)
relevant meta-codes. This process was  continued until theoretical
saturation was reached and no new codes, themes or insights were
being generated.
5. Homes as machines: expert imaginaries of a low carbon
future
This section explores the visions of the future through which
experts imagined low carbon housing in the UK, ﬁrst discussing
expert perceptions of the vision set out with UK housing policy
before moving on to describe the different ways that the experts
themselves imagined a low carbon housing future. The term zero
carbon was almost exclusively associated with UK low carbon
housing policy (described above), and was in a sense seen as a non-
future, unconnected to discussions surrounding the future of UK
housing. A ﬁrm (if challenging) commitment to tackling emissions
from the housing sector, many discussed how they had initially
supported the policy deﬁnition of a sustainable and net-zero car-
bon house. However, as subsequent announcements redeﬁned the
meaning of zero carbon, this term became seen as conceptually
problematic.
The exclusion of unregulated emissions (those related to the use
of the home i.e., through cooking and appliances) from the emis-
sions scope of the calculations determining the zero carbon status
of a house was  of particular concern [69]. This was  especially true
in the light of pre-existing objections to the exclusion of embodied
carbon emissions (associated with the raw materials, manufactur-
ing, transport and construction of the building). The introduction
of Allowable Solutions in 2013, which allowed developers to signif-
icantly widen the scope of mitigation measures counted towards
the achievement of the zero carbon standard, was  seen as a sig-
niﬁcant limitation to achieving signiﬁcant emissions reductions,
compounding this contempt and leading to a lack of belief in the
proposals.
For many, a net-zero carbon house (that over a year uses no more
energy than it generates, including both regulated and unregu-
lated emissions), remained the only credible vision for a low carbon
housing future. This narrowing of the boundaries within which a
zero carbon house was  conceptualised, was  seen as ‘watering down
at the behest of the house builders’ (Interview 3: Environmental
campaigner), with the policy no longer seem as appropriate to the
task of transitioning towards an environmentally friendly housing
stock. However, despite the ‘loss of faith that [zero carbon] really
means zero carbon’ (Interview 4: Environmental policy expert), this
term, as a label, was still seen by some to play a role in reﬂecting the
aspirations of the Code for Sustainable Homes, acting as a boundary
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bject [62] that allowed diverse actors to work towards this vision
f the future.
In contrast to the policy prescribed meaning of zero carbon
ousing, the term low carbon house (and the often interchangeable
ow energy house) was understood in relation to complex expert
isions of future housing that were rich in both technical and nor-
ative detail. Within these visions, two distinct and socially shared
deals for future low carbon housing emerged: Passivhaus and
mart Homes. The basis of both these housing options was rooted
n the longstanding discursive and technical dominance of energy
fﬁciency, stressing the need to address the fabric of the house;
his would perhaps include ‘more insulation, triple glazing win-
ows, [or] heat recovery ventilation systems, so it’s very high-spec
ompared to a normal current house’ (Interview 4: Environmental
olicy expert). However, beyond this, experts predominantly advo-
ated only one of these forms of housing, with the Passivhaus and
mart Home visions held up as distinct and contrasting imaginar-
es, as equally feasible but divergent visions to transform the UK
ousing sector.
Within both visions for a low carbon housing future (discussed
n detail below), assumptions surrounding both the role of house-
old occupants and the nature of ‘the public’ more widely are
learly intertwined with these technological imaginaries. Whilst
ost experts did not consider ‘the public’ to be one homoge-
ous group, the term was used consistently, often leading to broad
eneralisations about public opinion and acceptability. Often, the
ublic were characterised as made up of individuals who are either
ctively against low carbon housing and technologies or simply
mbivalent towards the concept, and only a small minority were
hought to be concerned for the environment or climate change.
or this reason, and echoing previous research discussed above,
he public were often characterised as self-interested and ﬁnan-
ially motivated when discussed in relation to low carbon housing.
n addition, experts believed the visual appearance of housing was
he key barrier to public acceptance of both visions for low carbon
ousing:
[T]he only one that anybody liked was the one that looks like
a traditional house, [. . .]  it just tells you about what goes on
in people’s minds, what’s their aversion. And it’s about funky
designs, they don’t like it, they want houses. (Interview 5: Hous-
ing and construction expert)
This belief laid the foundations for the general assumption that
ow carbon houses simply needed to look ‘normal’ (meaning as
lose to traditional terrace or semi-detached houses as possible)
n order to improve adoption rates cf.,  [70]. Likely stemming from
ecent Government reports surrounding the hassle factor associ-
ted with adopting home retroﬁt measures [19], the hassle and
isruption caused by installing, using and maintaining low carbon
ousing and technologies was also considered a signiﬁcant bar-
ier to adoption. Combined, a generally narrow conceptualisation
f a public was imagined, that could not (or would not) pay the
xtra cost of low carbon homes and technologies, and even if will-
ng and able to pay, would be put off by the hassle and disruption
urrounding these new technological systems.
In addition, the behavioural changes that may  be needed within
 low carbon home were also problematized. Conceptualisations of
ublics as resistant to changing their behaviours and practices, and
s primarily concerned with cost, visual aesthetics and ease of use,
hus fed into a techno-ﬁx discourse:
We  need to [. . .]  remove the user from having to do anything.
It just is efﬁcient, you don’t have to worry, you don’t have to
put pressure on people to change their behaviour. (Interview
14, Housing policy expert)ocial Science 23 (2017) 36–45
In contrast to the construction of rational publics in relation to
the acceptability of new forms of housing, when discussing the use
of technologies occupants were described as irrational and unpre-
dictable. As such, a framework for these visions was constructed
in which occupants, and the public more widely, are characterised
primarily as a barrier to achieving the low carbon futures, where
‘building a house is ﬁne, it’s putting the people in that’s the prob-
lem [laughs]’ (Interview 1: Construction project manager). We  now
contrast these two visions of a low carbon housing future, paying
particular attention to the constructions of the public embedded
within them and showing, ultimately, how both visions act to frame
the home as a machine, designing out occupants in order to reduce
carbon emissions and energy use.
5.1. Passivhaus
Developed in Germany, the Passivhaus standard aims to ‘dra-
matically reduce the requirement for space heating and cooling,
whilst also creating excellent indoor air quality and comfort levels’
[35], removing the need for traditional heating systems. Focusing
on thermal efﬁciency and MVHR (Mechanical Ventilation with Heat
Recovery) systems to ventilate near air-tight houses, Passivhauses
were generally considered a simple and effective way to reduce
heating requirements, whilst maintaining a comfortable tempera-
ture:
[It’s in] the fabric of the building, not throwing lots of equipment
inside and systems, because, matter of fact, it doesn’t normally
have heating in there. You know, you become the heating source
and the light bulb almost. (Interview 1: Construction project
manager)
Passivhaus was often seen as the pinnacle of low carbon/energy
housing, advocated as a replacement for the Code for Sustainable
Homes and forming the basis of a low carbon housing imaginary.
Whilst initially discussed as a solution to climate change through
energy demand reduction, embedded at the heart of the Passivhaus
vision was the belief that exceptional thermal efﬁciency could solve
a range of other social problems (e.g., energy affordability, fuel
poverty, health concerns), improving living conditions for occu-
pants. Ideals of simplicity, passivity and comfort were central, with
many drawing on personal experience to express how enjoyable
and warm Passivhauses are, the associated low energy bills and the
possible health beneﬁts they could bring (due to increased warmth
and improved indoor air quality).
However despite ﬁrm beliefs in their technological effective-
ness, questions about the role and inﬂuence of the Passivhaus
occupant remained. Pervading this vision was a characterisation
of the public as lacking in knowledge (both surrounding speciﬁc
technologies and wider understandings of climate change) and as a
barrier to achieving a low carbon future. Public acceptability of such
housing was questioned on the basis of both increased cost of build
and the visual appeal of these homes. In addition, the acceptability
of the technical conﬁguration of Passivhauses was also questioned.
Social preferences for indoor temperature were seen as particularly
problematic, raising concerns that although technically deemed to
provide acceptable heating services, the lack of any heating focal
points within Passivhauses was a possible barrier to adoption, due
to lack of control over heating levels and timings.
The perception that ‘people don’t understand technologies’
(Interview 5: Housing and construction expert) was also a strong
theme. Despite their professed simplicity, concerns arose regarding
the correct operation of these homes, evoking a sense that ‘it takes a
certain type of personality to live in and operate a Passivhaus in the
way that it needs to be operated’ (Interview 2: Professor of architec-
ture). Complex interactions between the house and occupants, the
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egarding the need for the correct use of technology, led many to
dvocate that the ‘best way to drive down the carbon use in prop-
rties is actually to take people out of the equation’ (Interview 5:
ousing and construction expert). Underlying this, the metaphor of
omes as machines brings to light a desire to design out public the
nﬂuence on household energy use, hinting at a deeper belief in the
ower of technology alone to solve environmental problems c.f.,
60]. This echoes assumptions within academic and policy arenas
hat technologies can and should be optimised to achieve energy
eductions by working around occupants rather than with them
.g., [43,63].
.2. Smart homes
Contrasting largely passive, low-tech houses of the future
ffered by the Passivhaus imaginary, the Smart Home provided
 divergent, high-tech vision of future housing. Whilst there is
o single deﬁnition, a smart house incorporates ‘information and
ommunication technologies (ICTs) distributed throughout rooms,
evices and systems (lighting, heating, ventilation) relaying infor-
ation to users and feeding back user or automated commands
o manage the domestic environment’ [72]: 463. Smart meters
intelligent gas and electricity meters that provide information
nd feedback on home energy use, communicating directly with
nergy suppliers) that connect every home to the smart grid (a
exible electricity supply network, allowing two-way communi-
ation and rapid response to changes in demand), formed the key
echnological components of this vision. Smart appliances, which
ake use of wireless technology, provide information on energy
onsumption and communicate with the household smart meter
nd other products, were also prominent. The fundamental pur-
ose of smart housing is demand management and reducing peak
nergy demand. Whilst energy security was the primary focus of
his vision, it was also promoted as crucial for low carbon energy
ystems due to its ability to cope with variable renewable energy
upply; and as such was premised on the successful large-scale
doption of low carbon energy sources. Interestingly, this vision
mitted other frames previously highlighted as beneﬁts of smart
ousing such as health beneﬁts, assistive living and security [72].
The role of the public was less of a concern, with the acceptability
f Smart Homes largely unquestioned following assumptions that
echnologically savvy citizens would easily adapt to novel Wi-Fi
nd app-enabled systems. Rejection of smart, automated technol-
gy due to reduced personal control over heating and appliances
as dismissed. Media concern surrounding this issue was  per-
eived as hype, relating to a number of (then recent) newspaper
rticles, such as the Daily Mail’s ‘Big brother to switch off your
ridge’ [48]:
I can’t see why, as long as you get the service you want, you know
your fridge stays cold enough and your hot water is there when
you need it, why you’d worry about that, but it’s presented as an
incredibly invasive technology, which I ﬁnd strange. (Interview
4: Environmental policy expert)
Constructed as rational actors, willing and able to participate in
nd beneﬁt from this transition, the possibility of reduced energy
ills was thought to override any public resistance to the intrusion
f smart technologies, with people happy to relinquish control in
xchange for cheaper energy services (c.f., ‘Resource Man’ [66]).
owever, although cost savings are an important consideration
72], recent research has highlighted the complexity surrounding
ublic perceptions of smart technologies, highlighting unease over
haring personal energy data, with the individuals most concerned
ith household energy affordability most likely to demonstrate
oncern [61].ocial Science 23 (2017) 36–45 41
Despite this conceptualisation of the public, few believed
that merely providing information regarding personal/household
energy use would lead to behavioural change (echoing [57]). An
ability to learn and adapt to occupant behaviour was often consid-
ered fundamental to success:
If you had controls that learn about patterns of user behaviour
and then adapt it to that, that would be a smart control. But
there’s nothing smart about one that tells you’re wasting energy.
If you get a smart meter at the moment all it does is tell you’re
really wasteful. (Interview 5: Housing and construction expert)
Aimed at designing out the inﬂuence of occupants on household
energy use, in this sense occupants were, at best, considered to be
unruly decision makers. The homes as machines metaphor is thus
also present, with the need for fully automated smart systems (that
control heating, lighting and appliances) widely advocated.
6. Reconﬁguring homes: public acceptability of low carbon
housing visions
We now move on to explore public acceptability of future
low carbon housing, focusing speciﬁcally on the Passivhaus and
Smart Home visions before discussing broader values and concerns
that inﬂuenced perceptions of how a low carbon housing future
should unfold. Passivhauses were popular, with several partici-
pants already aware of the concept. In addition to lower energy bills,
their simple design, high energy efﬁciency, and comfortable nature
made these houses appealing. New ventilation systems (MHVR)
were reasonably well received, although concerns were raised over
possible implications for the comfort and atmosphere of homes due
to the ‘noise pollution’ from the system’s ‘constant whir’ (Gemma,
Focus Group 1: Postgraduate students, Cardiff), which despite the
noise of existing technologies such as boilers and radiators, was
seen as potentially intrusive. The associated changes to heating
conﬁgurations, such as the removal of radiators, were rarely seen
as an issue, with many in favour of removing radiators completely:
Glen:Yeah, as long as the house is warm.
Russell: Yeah if you don’t need radiators. You’ve only got radia-
tors because you need them to heat your house. If you’re heating
it in different ways, you don’t need radiators.
Glen: If you don’t have radiators you don’t drape damp washing
over them to dry them out and put damp into the air.
Russell: They are nice for putting a towel on and trousers. I think
I’d miss that. (Focus group 3: Church group, King’s Lynn)
This contrasts with previous research that suggests that the
lack of heating focal points may not satisfy residents’ requirements
for comfort, despite reaching the temperature deemed technically
acceptable within the home [23]; although this may  in part be due
to the lack of personal experience with such changes, or perhaps
due to the wider age range of participants sampled here.
Public awareness of smart and automated technologies or the
concept of a Smart Home was  low. Contrasting the discussions
surrounding Passivhaus, the aesthetics of these homes was not con-
cerning due to the relatively minor changes to the fabric of smart
homes. The additional control over home energy use that smart
technology could provide was appreciated, especially the idea of
controlling your heating while away from home:
Chris: I’ve got nothing against that. As long as it would be easier
for me  to use than the dodgy dial on the wall that doesn’t seem
to do much.
Louise: Yeah, you can properly regulate things a lot more effec-
tively.
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Gemma: Yeah, there’s a new thing you’ve got on your phone.
You can get an app where you can turn the heating on before
you get home, which means you can make your house warm.
(Focus group 1: Postgraduate students, Cardiff)
However, automatic heating systems and appliances, that
educe occupant control, were viewed with suspicion and scep-
icism by many. This was seen as raising issues around personal
rivacy and security (discussed below), and as practically and
nancially infeasible, being ‘hugely expensive to implement [as
verything] would have to have its own little logic device’ (Mervin,
ocus Group 5: Environmental group, Barmouth).
Increasing renewable energy use was popular, and in principle
t least, participants were not averse to adopting new household
nergy technologies in the future. Photovoltaic panels were the
east controversial, considered the only viable micro-scale electric-
ty generation system. Some participants had direct experience of
nstalling these in their homes, while others had tried (and failed)
o adopt solar panels, or been offered them through Government
r energy company schemes. However, despite support in princi-
le, the relatively high upfront costs were seen as prohibitive to
any, as well as concerns about the unstable nature of national
nergy policy, with the Government seen as always ‘changing the
oal posts’ (Deborah, Focus Group 2: Farming community, Newcas-
le Emlyn). Harnessing solar energy was seen as a key component
f the national energy mix  in the long term c.f.,  [20], with possible
echnological innovations, such as inbuilt solar roof tiles, suggested
o moderate objections to the visual appearance of this technology.
n contrast, transitioning towards new low carbon/low energy heat-
ng systems was a topic of extensive debate, with new technologies
uch as personal biomass boilers proving controversial (due to both
ractical and safety concerns).
Whether for environmental or economic reasons, most par-
icipants demonstrated some desire to move towards low
arbon/energy housing. However, a range of concerns were raised,
ome of which matched expert expectations of public acceptabil-
ty, some of which did not. The cost of low carbon housing was of
ourse a concern, focusing on personal rather than national afford-
bility, with both capital costs and payback times of concern. Most
articipants felt low carbon homes and technologies were only an
ption for the very wealthy and were currently out of reach for
he average citizen, despite a desire to ‘live in a house that saved
lectricity or brought the bills down’ (Glen, Focus Group 3: Church
roup, King’s Lynn).
More complex than simply unwillingness or inability to pay, the
ssue of payback times (the time taken to recoup the initial invest-
ent and begin making cost savings) was a key concern. Personal,
amily and ﬁnancial circumstances were considered highly rele-
ant given the unpredictable nature of modern life, with payback
imes above 10 years seen as particularly unreasonable. Retroﬁtting
xisting homes, was thus seen as the more worthwhile compared
o the long payback times presented by the purchase of a new low
arbon house (from the slow rate that home energy bill savings
ccrued). These concerns were strongest amongst younger partic-
pants who couldn’t afford to buy a house, and whose desire to
et on the housing ladder was dominated by other priorities (pri-
arily cost and location). Later in life, the desire to remain settled
ithin one’s existing home dictated opinions on low carbon new
uild. As such, attention returned to retroﬁtting; with no inten-
ion of moving, participants were more willing to pay for efﬁciency
mprovements, although concerns over ﬁnancial security, including
amily responsibility and preparing for old age still took priority.Complicating somewhat the expert belief that the ‘hassle fac-
or’ related primarily to the practical impacts of building work in
he home [19,8], public experiences of home improvements sug-
ested instead that gaining planning permission, choosing effectiveocial Science 23 (2017) 36–45
and appropriate technologies and employing trustworthy installers
was of greater concern. The ability to adapt and change your home
for whatever reason was  deemed a non-negotiable aspect of home
ownership, with the implications of making functional changes
(e.g., the impacts of installing a cat ﬂap on thermal efﬁciency)
off-putting in relation to new build housing. Regarding the practi-
calities of everyday life, several issues were highlighted around the
appropriate and effective use of low carbon/low energy technolo-
gies. Whilst experts’ concerns centred on the correct operation of
Passivhauses and Smart Homes, participants focused on the new
routines and practices would be required, such as the implica-
tions of removing radiators (see above) on drying washing indoors,
highlighting the need for a dedicated drying area to be provided.
Concerns were also raised regarding new heating systems such as
wood burning stoves and biomass generators due to the increased
physical and storage demands of buying, storing and using wood
or pellets.
Safety and security implications were also of great concern.
The economic, functional, and social risks of adopting new tech-
nologies [40] were seen as paramount, generally falling into three
categories: fear of ﬁnancial loss, fear of malfunction and fear of
personal danger. Contrary to some experts’ beliefs, the social risk
that low carbon choices might be considered unacceptable by peers
or wider society was not a salient concern. Financial security was
often seen as crucial in feeling at home within your house, with ris-
ing energy bills adding to this pressure. Adopting non-mainstream
energy technologies was considered particularly risky following
suggestions that innovative technologies may: have a shorter lifes-
pan; fail to become widely adopted; or become rapidly obsolete.
Another common fear was that new or immature technology would
malfunction, leaving occupants vulnerable within their homes. Los-
ing power or heating (or both) through malfunction was seen as
a fundamental risk, leading to anxiety surrounding the inconve-
nience of disruption to key services within the household, and the
hassle and responsibility involved in making repairs c.f., [54].
This reluctance to increase risks that already exist when using
mainstream technologies was  repeatedly highlighted, and led some
to the conclude that low carbon/energy houses would always need
‘a back-up generator, and a back-up, back-up generator’ (Louise,
Focus Group 1: Postgraduate students, Cardiff). Although rarer and
often contested, high levels of anxiety were displayed towards the
adoption of new technologies by some, exposing a fear that they
pose a serious safety threat to occupants. These possible dangers
were particularly acute in relation to the consequences of malfunc-
tioning smart and automated technology, both in terms of personal
safety in the home and the security of personal information and
data:
Claire: I wouldn’t feel safe with the electric door.
Alice: No.
Claire: I would feel unsafe. What if it locks you in? What if it
locks you out?
Eleri: What if there’s a ﬁre and it meant you couldn’t get out?
(Focus group 2: Farming community, Newcastle Emlyn)
As with any home, visual appeal was  important in determining
personal opinions of low carbon houses, to some extent reﬂecting
experts’ constructions of public acceptability. However, personal
preferences were varied and diverse, and far more complex than
assumed by experts. Focusing on ideals of normality and homeli-
ness, some demonstrated a desire for a traditional house that didn’t
look ‘space-agey and weird’ (Gemma, Focus Group 1: Postgraduate
students, Cardiff) or ‘cold and sort of experimental’ (Peter, Focus
Group 5: Environmental group, Barmouth). However, while the tra-



























































iC. Cherry et al. / Energy Resear
o feeling at home for some, others were open-minded and excited
y the possibility of a unique home that was ‘sharp, modern, cool’
Russell, Focus Group 3: Church group, King’s Lynn). Homeliness
as crucial, seen as something you created and that encompassed
oth sensual and physical elements, such as comfort, warmth, light
nd style c.f., [23].
Related to issues of privacy, personal space and noise pollu-
ion, the conﬁguration of local neighbourhoods that low carbon
ousing was situated presented a further element contributing to
eelings of homeliness and comfort. This feeling was  particularly
elevant to more densely populated options, with housing com-
lexes and apartment buildings described as akin to ‘rabbit hutches’
Daniel, Focus Group 3: Church group, King’s Lynn). The architec-
ure and social conﬁguration of this type of housing was perceived
s constraining occupant identity, where all residents must ‘wear
he same, look the same, have the same car’ (Lisa, Focus Group 4:
rangetown local residents, Cardiff), leading to a loss of individual-
ty and a sense that some housing was only ‘appropriate’ for certain
eople or lifestyles.
In addition to economic, technical and social concerns, a ﬁnal
heme running through the discussions revolved around estab-
ishing the true environmental credentials of low carbon housing
utures. Ascertaining which house was really the most environ-
entally friendly was seen as difﬁcult, with many participants
elieving they needed more information to make the best choice.
ssumptions were often made regarding which houses were more
nvironmentally friendly on the basis of visual aesthetics, with cer-
ain styles assumed to be the lowest carbon/energy houses e.g.,
igh-tech houses with extensive solar panel arrays or grass-roofed
co-houses. However, even the environmental credentials of these
ouses were questioned, with discussions surrounding possible
mbodied emissions within these supposedly ‘low carbon’ houses
nd technology.
More broadly, the effectiveness of these houses within wider
missions reduction strategies was also questioned. The issue of ris-
ng population was seen to require a solution that can work for the
ntire country, rather than a niche solution for only a small number
due to either ﬁnancial or spatial constraints). From this perspec-
ive, apartments (the least attractive option on a personal level),
ere considered the most eco-friendly, as more people are housed
ithin an area, conserving both energy and materials. However,
espite reﬂections regarding the balance between ‘what we want
s an individual’ (Joan, Focus Group 5: Environmental group, Bar-
outh) and achieving large-scale emissions reductions, this insight
oes not make these low carbon housing options more appealing.
onsidering possible compromises to this dilemma, the concept
f a Passivhaus was seen as a more appropriate low carbon mass
ousing option.
. Concluding discussion
Despite recently dropping down the UK policy agenda, the need
o transition towards a low carbon housing future is becoming
ncreasingly urgent. As such, the visions and expectations of the
rofessionals to be charged with delivering this future will play a
ey role in determining the pathway by which this transition takes
lace. We  identiﬁed two competing visions of a low carbon housing
uture: Passivhaus, advocating the low-tech building standard that
rovides high thermal efﬁciency; and Smart Homes, advocating a
igh-tech and automated approach to controlling home energy use.
Whilst often portrayed as contrasting possibilities, both futures
hared the objective of ‘designing out’ the role of occupants, and
ence achieving emissions reductions through changing the built
nvironment and maintaining current lifestyles. An ambivalent
magined public populated these visions, with the idealised indi-ocial Science 23 (2017) 36–45 43
viduals needed to ensure the successful transition to a low carbon
housing future, simultaneously critiqued as deﬁcient in knowledge,
skills and environmental concern c.f., [31]. Concerns were thus
raised whether publics were able, and indeed willing, to adapt to
these new housing systems due to the increasing level of exper-
tise and engagement needed to understand and properly operate
these technologies. Stressing the need for simple design, experts
took the approach that reducing energy use needed to be achieved
as passively as possible or with automatic systems that were easy
to understand and control.
This is not to say that complex socio-technical interactions were
not acknowledged within the discourse surrounding low carbon
housing. Rather that, whilst recognising the role of occupants in
correct operation of the technology, many were sceptical of the pos-
sibilities for enacting behaviour or lifestyle change, advocating an
increasingly technical approach to bypass this issue. In many ways,
Strengers’ [66] vision of Smart Utopia encapsulates the visions of
the future bound up within these techno-centric visions of low car-
bon housing. Here smartness is seen as an extension of broader
societal discourses of convenience [56,26], in which services are
delivered in the background of daily life, increasing automation so
that occupants retain less control over energy practices. The combi-
nation of preserving the status quo of everyday life and increasing
technological dependence within these imaginaries is important,
especially considering the likely impact on the ability of these
homes to actually achieve emissions reductions.
As Walker et al. [69] discuss, the high level of socio-material
interdependence embedded within the socio-technical system of a
low carbon house, is instrumental in determining the carbon emis-
sions of a given home. Recent research highlights the discrepancy
between the normative assumptions made by experts surround-
ing how technology will be used within the home and actual use
[50], with individual energy practices found to undermine or sub-
vert the principles on which this form of housing is based [66]. As
part of this system, imagined publics thus play an active role in
shaping the development of technologies and policy [70,57]. The
imagined publics within the dominant socio-technical imaginar-
ies of low carbon housing clearly inﬂuenced expert perceptions of
future possibilities, leading to a techno-centric focus on the role
of technology in reducing carbon emissions and a desire to ‘design
out’ occupant inﬂuence on household energy use.
Questioning the reliability of these imaginaries, we  explored
visions of a low carbon housing future with members of the
public to identify the values and concerns that inﬂuenced their
perceptions. Whilst participants did, of course, show concern for
aesthetics, cost and hassle (believed to be key determinants of
public acceptability), these concerns were not conﬁned within
the narrow expectations of experts’ imagined publics. Speciﬁcally,
claims that publics: wanted a house that looked like a house; would
not pay the extra cost of low carbon homes and technologies; and
even if willing and able to pay would be put off by the hassle and
disruption of installing and using new technologies, did not fully
take account of the complex personal and cultural dimensions of
comfort and identity. Comfort took on many forms in addition
to aesthetics, warmth and light of any house. Both personal and
cultural identity were bound up with design and technology, man-
ifested in the importance of personalising the home, and through
the wider social connotations associated with housing conﬁgura-
tions; houses were deemed appropriate only for a certain type of
individual, with acceptability judged primarily on personal identi-
ﬁcation with the style of the property, the wider neighbourhood in
which it was set, or imagined occupants that might be living within
it.
Control formed the second broad value under which these
houses were evaluated. Freedom to modify the house was impor-
tant for personal autonomy, with any restrictions to this, such as not
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reaking the thermal envelope of a building, considered an unrea-
onable expectation. Personal control over energy use was  also
esirable, with participants ambivalent to smart and automated
echnologies that on one hand offered increased control through
onitors and app-enabled systems, whilst on the other hand raised
ears over relinquishing control over energy use (and personal data)
o energy companies. Personal security was also foregrounded,
ith insecurity permeating discussions of low carbon homes and
echnologies, focusing on risks around ﬁnancial loss, the loss of
nergy services (and thus the comfort and convenience they pro-
ide), and the loss of time and effort due to increased maintenance
equirements, as well as some concerns about the safety of such
echnology. As such, whilst concerns around affordability are often
nterpreted by experts as an expression of ﬁnancial concerns for
eturns on investment, participants concerns were instead in part
ooted in deeper insecurities relating to the unpredictable nature
f modern life.
This gap between the imagined publics inhabiting expert visions
f a low carbon housing future and the preferences and values
f participants, hints at tensions that may  arise as we  attempt to
ransition towards new socio-technical systems. Radical change in
oth the material and social aspects of our homes are required to
uccessfully tackle climate change. We  argue here that both ide-
lised and deﬁcient imagined publics are unhelpful for this task,
cting as a barrier to envisioning future lifestyles change, and clos-
ng down debate surrounding demand reduction strategies and the
uture of housing [64]. Underpinned by a common perception of
he public as preoccupied with cost and visual aesthetics and thus
nable/unwilling to accept any level of lifestyle change, the socio-
echnical imaginaries and imagined publics of low carbon housing
cted to reinforce each other. This contributed to the perpetuation
f the perception that a technological approach to mitigation is
he only possibility for achieving a low carbon housing future. As
uch, the construction of such visions of the future must now be
pened up. In order to understand public acceptability of low car-
on housing options, these houses must be understood not just as a
ombination of the material and technological elements of low car-
on housing, or even through the interactions between occupants
nd these elements, but also as a home, embodying broader values
f comfort, control and security that moderate economic, technical
nd environmental concerns. Visions of a low carbon future that
ook towards an ever more automated and high-tech approach are
hus unlikely to succeed in achieving the desired emissions reduc-
ions until they accept the need to work with, rather than around,
he publics which inhabit them.
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